Abstract
Introduction
In the past services were seen as non-tradable, and restricting cross-border trade in services largely a non-issue, except in a few sectors such as transport and finance. However, the rapidly rising share of trade to GDP, and the ease with which information and ideas flow across borders involve internationalisation of services as well. One driving force has been multinational firms in manufacturing and extractive industries that require suppliers to provide services to the entire international operations network. Other driving forces have been market opportunities in foreign countries following technology improvements and a general shift in demand from goods to services, including more services-intensive ways of organizing production and trade. International production networks, more complex regulation, private standards related both to products and production processes come to mind.
Growing internationalisation has revealed services trade barriers which have become subject to negotiations with the view to reducing them both at multilateral and regional levels. Some services trade barriers are explicit, such as restrictions on foreign ownership, scope of business of foreign services providers or corporate form. However, OECD members have relatively low explicit services trade barriers and remaining barriers mainly stem from different approaches to regulation. Concerns about international investment and foreign takeovers appear, however, to be on the rise and several OECD countries have tightened regulation and administrative practices for national security reasons, it is claimed. The services sectors in which strategic and security considerations have arisen in relation to foreign investment are transport, media and finance (OECD, 2007a) . As will be discussed in this paper, complying with regulation can inflict considerable costs on a company. Regulation is of course necessary in complex economies and some compliance costs are unavoidable, but complying with multiple regulatory regimes implies additional costs on foreign services providers, some of which could be avoided with smarter and better coordinated regulation.
The WTO definition of international services trade includes different supply modes: not only cross-border trade, but also the foreign provision of services through local subsidiaries (FDI, "commercial presence") , and temporary movement of natural persons. This paper provides an empirical analysis of the impact of regulatory differences on services trade through commercial presence. In addition it provides a first attempt at estimating how such differences affect whether services suppliers would enter a foreign market through investment or cross-border trade in sectors where cross-border trade is feasible. Understanding how modes of supply are related is important when conducting impact analysis of regulation on international trade. If for instance commercial presence or cross-border movement of natural persons is essential for supplying a foreign market, having free cross-border trade only may not amount to much in terms of market access on the ground.
By the same token cross-border trade restrictions would not add much if other modes are restricted too. Conversely, if trade can be easily shifted from commercial presence to cross-border trade, for instance via the internet, then restricting commercial presence only will have a small impact. 3 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section two sets the scene by reviewing existing literature and describing recent developments in trade by mode. Section three presents the model and reports the regression results. Policy implications are discussed in Section four.
Relation to previous research
Regulatory measures may affect cross-border trade in services through two mechanisms. It increases the fixed cost of entering a market and the variable costs of servicing that market. For a firm that enters a new country market the costs of adapting its operations to local regulations is a fixed costs entry barrier. If the regulation is very country-specific, such costs are sunk. If market entry is unsuccesful, the incurred costs for adapting to local regulations are forfeit. Firms because of the sunk entry costs consider the entry of foreign markets as an investment decision: do they expect that the net present value of summed future profits in the export market outweigh the fixed costs that the firm has to absorb at the moment of entry? This decision drives a self-selection process that is central in the recent theory on trade with heterogeneous firms. 4 If exporting firms are confronted with up-front market-entry costs they need a 'performance premium' in order to compensate such costs and at least break even. The firms make an assessment of their own chances of success on the basis of their relative productivity. Only the firms with the highest productivity or lowest marginal costs can profitably overcome sunk market-entry costs and thus self-select into becoming an exporter.
Entry barriers consist of direct investment costs and the cost of complying with regulation. The latter contains costs such as registration fees and other fees and charges payable to the host government authorities. Such charges can be trivial in OECD countries, often in the range of a few hundred dollars. 5 Indirect compliance cost with regulation, in contrast, can be substantial and foreign investors often incur considerable legal expenses in order to familiarise themselves with regulation and adjust their business practices accordingly. 6 Cross-border trade costs include communications costs, restrictions on cross-border transactions and restrictions on business travel.
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Exporting services firms often deliver part of their product by a temporary local presence in the foreign market, which means that they have to deal with local, country-specific product-market regulations and labour laws. Service firms with local subsidiaries in a foreign market are affected by sunk costs resulting from local regulations in the area of environment, labour and spatial planning.
Trade and entry barriers play a role both for the volume of FDI and its importance relative to trade.
There is a vast literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment. Several papers argue that firms that set up a foreign subsidiary through FDI generally incur larger country-specific sunk costs than firms that access a foreign market through exports (Helpman et al. 2004; Mayer and Ottaviano 2007) . The literature distinguishes between horizontal and vertical investment on the one hand and green-field investment versus mergers and acquisitions on the other. The two dimensions bring different aspects into the analysis. For horizontal investment the analysis typically focuses on the relative importance of cross-border trade costs and the entry cost of setting up production in a foreign location. There is of course the old tariff-jumping motive for preferring FDI over trade when tariffs make cross-border exports unprofitable (Blonigen et al. 2002) . Investment also becomes the preferred mode if trade costs are high and entry barriers low relative to the size of the targeted market (e.g.
Markusen, 2002).
Vertical foreign investment is usually seen as complementary to international trade and allows a firm to optimize its supply chain by locating production of parts, components, tasks and assembly where it is the most cost effective (e.g. Markusen, 2002 ch 9; Helpman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) . Gains from vertical FDI stem from differences in factor prices and firm-level scale economies, which can be more easily exploited the lower are trade and investment barriers. Mergers and acquisitions bring strategic motives into the picture. Empirically this is the most important way of establishing a commercial presence in a foreign market. M&A typically come in waves and often shortly after episodes of trade liberalisation (Neary, 2007) .
Services are typically heterogeneous and leave room for a broad variety of services providers -large and small, cost-effective and less so and specialised niche providers alongside high-volume low margin providers. The coexistence of a vast variety of services within a sector suggests that services may be poor substitutes for each other. If so, there will be some positive demand for local services even in the event of the entry of more efficient multinational services providers. Thus, with heterogeneous services, local firms are more likely to survive trade liberalisation even if they do not match foreign competitors' prices and cost effectiveness (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) . However, Chaney (2008) shows that a low elasticity of substitution makes entry of foreign firms more sensitive to changes in trade costs. Since competition is less fierce, entrants can expect a larger market share the lower the elasticity of substitution.
Regulation levels have come down in OECD countries in the major services sectors during the past 20 years, so one would expect that their role as a trade barrier would also fade out.
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Nevertheless, a study by Coeurdacier et al. (2008) establishes that the relative strictness of national product-market regulations has a particularly strong and negative impact on cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the services industry. In an earlier paper we found that regulatory heterogeneity has a relatively large negative impact on both market entry and subsequent trade flows (Kox and Nordås, 2007) . Moreover, regulation in the home country also appears to influence the behaviour of firms;
regulatory barriers appeared to have a negative effect on the country's services export performance. Table 1 summarises the potential regulatory impacts on services trade. It distinguishes between the effects of regulation on up-front costs that arise at firm entry in a foreign market, and the effects on For instance between 1987 and 2003 entry barriers as measured by the OECD product market regulation indicators for major non-manufacturing sectors declined from 5.0 to 1.6 on average.The index comprises transport (except maritime transport), telecommunications, postal services, electricity and gas and ranks between 0 and 6 with 6 being the most restrictive.
variable operational costs that on a more permanent basis influence transaction volumes after entry choices and mode choices have been made. Lanz, Miroudot and Nordås (2009) find that the extensive margin of services trade is more sensitive to changes in trade costs than is goods trade. Heterogeneous products that are traded on the basis of a legal contract between sellers and buyers are found to be sensitive to differences in legal systems (Turrini and Ypersele, 2006) . Indeed, it is argued that the border effect found in most studies on determinants of international trade occurs precisely because a national boundary draws the frontier between two legal systems. Since services are even more dependent on contractual relationships between sellers and buyers than are differentiated goods, it is likely that differences in legal frameworks and regulation in general are important determinants of bilateral trade and investment flows in services.
The relative importance of FDI has increased as depicted in Figure 1 which shows the ratio of cross-border exports to outward foreign affiliate sales (FAS) and cross-border imports relative to inward FAS respectively in the US during the two decades between 1986 and 2006. The relative importance of foreign affiliate sales has increased sharply since 1994 for outward FAS and during the entire period for inward FAS. Cross-border exports of services were almost 30% larger than outward FAS in 1986, while exports were only half of outward FAS in 2006.
The contribution from this paper is mainly empirical. We focus on the impact of regulatory barriers ─both regulation levels and bilateral regulatory differences -on aggregate foreign direct investment in services. 9 More in particular, we explore how regulatory barriers affect both the volume of FDI flows and the choice of mode of services trade. We pay particular attention to the role of regulatory heterogeneity between home country and potential host countries as a determinant of the trade versus investment decision. The fixed costs of complying with regulation could be a source of scale economies in foreign expansion, if compliance with the home-market regulation would be recognized in other countries. But since such mutual recognition is lacking between most countries, regulatory heterogeneity between countries can be an effective trade barrier. One important insight from the paper is that the perhaps most important barriers to trade and investment in services are not on the negotiation table in the WTO, as explicit barriers to trade and investment are few in OECD countries while harmonization or mutual recognition of regulation are not on the agenda.
The model
The gravity model has become the workhorse model for assessing the relationship between trade costs and trade flows; i.e. the allocation of output between different markets as a function of relative trade costs and relative market size. The model has also been widely used for analyzing the geographical allocation of investment funds (Barba Navetti and Venables, 2004; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007 ).
The gravity model features monopolistic competition in the market for final services where consumers maximize utility by spreading their consumption on all available varieties offered in the local market according to the relative price of each variety. They obtain utility from both the quantity 9 We would have liked to focus on the differences in factors that drive the firm behaviour at the intensive and extensive margin of trade through commercial presence. A lack of internationally comparative data prevents us from studying the weight of these factors at the firm level.
of each variety consumed and from having access to a broader variety of goods and services. A common assumption is that consumers spend a constant share of their income on each product category (i.e. a nested CES function where product categories or sectors are nested according to Cobb Douglas preferences) while individual varieties within a services category are nested according to a CES function where the elasticity of substitution between individual varieties is larger than unity.
Demand in country j for a variety produced in country i in sector s is given by:
Where E j is total consumer expenditure in country j, ( ) ( ) 
Hence the relation between trade and FDI becomes: An alternative way of expressing equation (3) when applied to FAS data is to introduce combined GDP of the country pairs and the similarity of their market sizes. With considerable investment costs, market size is crucial for the investment decision and it is useful to study the effect of market size explicitly rather than lumping it together with other country-specific variables in the country dummy.
The combined markets and the difference in market size are both bilateral variables. 
with: has shown that in models with differentiated products, exports can be expressed as the product of the number of exporting firms, the average output price of these firms and the average quantity exported by each firm. He also shows that with this specification the marginal impact of distance on trade flows is non-linear and depends on the number of products being exported and relative prices. We use this insight to include the product of the level or regulation in the source and host country respectively and distance. This takes into account that the impact of distance on trade and FAS flows depend on the resistance terms, and the regulatory restrictiveness level is assumed to be one determinant of the resistance term. In addition it creates a bilateral variable that incorporates the regulatory level. This is useful, since it is reasonable to control for regulatory level when analysing the impact of regulatory heterogeneity, and it is otherwise difficult to distinguish the regulatory levels from the country dummies (data on regulation is available for two years only 
where bilateral stocks of FDI are used as a proxy for sales of foreign affiliates. We are aware that a fully specified gravity model according to should include a number of additional interaction variables (income and bilateral trade costs). However, the limited number of observations in our sample creates problems of distinguishing between direct and indirect impact of bilateral trade costs, and we therefore limit the combination variable to the ones of interest; regulatory barriers.
The data
The dwarfing the others. Furthermore, the growth rate has also been among the highest in this sector, but comes second to transport, which has grown fast from a low base.
Information on regulation is from the following sources: the OECD Product Market
Regulation ( Heterogeneity indices for all Doing Business indicators were developed and introduced in the regressions, one by one. Only the statistically significant are reported.
Results

Regulation and FDI
The gravity model is first used to estimate the relation between regulation and commercial presence where the bilateral inward FDI stock is used as a proxy. This is motivated by the fact that FDI stocks are better covered in the data than foreign affiliate sales. Besides the capital output ratio is usually fairly stable over time since the capital stock determines production capacity, and changes in capacity utilization is not likely to be large enough to create serious problems for the results. 13 The results for aggregate services are presented in Table 3 . We only report regressions with statistically significant regulatory measures. In all tables ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at a 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. In all tables standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The results are robust to using the alternative specifications 5b or 6b.
Total services
Bilateral FDI for total services falls off with distance while increasing in combined market size, market size similarity and other similarities captured by common language and belonging to the European Union. Regulatory heterogeneity as captured by the aggregate bilateral PMR heterogeneity indicator has a relatively large and negative impact on bilateral FDI stocks. It is also found that the disadvantage of remoteness is larger the stricter is regulation so that a country will attract less FDI in services from distant sources the stricter is its regulation. This result appears for the aggregate PMR indicator as well as the several sub-indicators. The only individual heterogeneity sub-indicator that is significantly related to FDI when regulatory level is controlled for is barriers to competition, a result
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The correlation between inward FDI stocks and inward FAS for total services was found to be 0.77 (based on 1131 observations). For financial services the correlation was 0.80 (464 observations), but for the other services sectors correlation was weaker (0.55 for telecoms, 0.53 for other business services, 0.32 for computer services and only 0.10 for transport). Since the correlation is very high for total services and the highly specialised financial services, a possible reason for weaker correlations in other sectors is that multinational firms are multiproduct firms that sell goods and services other than the products falling under their main activities.
that underscores the complementarity between trade policy in a broad sense and competition policy.
14 Also the Cost of Doing Business heterogeneity indices are significantly and negatively associated with bilateral FDI stocks. The effect of being a member of the European Union disappears when regulatory heterogeneity is included in the regression, which suggests that regulatory harmonisation is one of the key factors behind the estimated positive impact of EU membership on bilateral FDI. In order to explore the possibility that EU attracts investments from non-members, a dummy which is one if the host country is an EU member and the source country is not was introduced together with the heterogeneity indices. This turned out not to produce significant results at the aggregate services level, but as we shall see below, for some services sectors it did.
Financial services
The determinants of bilateral foreign direct investment in financial services were explored using the general bilateral PMR heterogeneity indices, the Cost of Doing Business indicators and the bilateral Banking Regulation heterogeneity indices. The details of the regression results are reported in the Annex. It is observed that commercial presence is more sensitive to market size than the average for services sectors. EU membership appears to stimulate intra-EU investment, but EU does not seem to attract more third country investments. 15 The PMR heterogeneity indicators that are statistically significant when controlling for the (distance adjusted) level of regulation are: the overall PMR indicator; state control; and barriers to competition, while the (distance-adjusted) PMR levels in the potential host country that are significantly and negatively related to bilateral FDI are the overall index; barriers to trade and investment; public ownership; public intervention in business operations;
and administrative burdens on start-ups. Stricter regulation captured by these indicators is associated with lower inward investments. Heterogeneity in the Cost of Doing Business policy areas covered by "starting a business", "trade across borders" and "getting credit" are also negatively associated with bilateral investment. Among the banking regulation heterogeneity indicators, bank supervision was the only one that had a statistically significant impact in the regressions. These results are qualitatively similar to a study on German banks that found that country risk and banking supervision were the most important determinants of FDI (Buch and Lipponer, 2007) .
Telecommunications
Among the standard gravity variables that have the strongest statistical and economical association with bilateral FDI stocks in telecommunications are common language where countries that share a common language had almost 7-fold higher bilateral FDI stocks. 16 Having a common border, in contrast, is estimated to be negatively related to bilateral FDI, and the effect is relatively large. A possible explanation is that a neighbouring country is easier to service through cross-border trade, which is in fact what is found in the next section where the impact of regulation on choice of mode is analysed. There is finally weak support for the hypothesis that EU membership both stimulates intra-EU investments and attracts investment from third countries. None of the PMR heterogeneity indices were statistically significant in determining FDI in this sector, but the levels of regulation as captured by the overall PMR indicator, state control and administrative burden on start-ups in the host country are negatively associated with FDI inflows. Among the World Bank Cost of Doing Business indicators, heterogeneity on the sub-indicator related to the enforcement of contracts is negatively associated with bilateral FDI stocks.
OECD provides sector-specific indicators of both FDI restrictiveness and product market regulation for telecommunications. These indicators do not contain sufficient details for a meaningful 16 The impact is calculated on the basis of the lowest coefficient in the regressions reported in Table A3 which is 1.888. heterogeneity index to be developed. 17 The relationship between the level of restrictiveness and FDI was therefore the focus of analysis, and evidence is found that FDI restrictions are strongly and negatively associated with FDI. Interestingly, the impact in the source country appears to be the strongest. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in the FDI restrictiveness index for telecommunications reduces FDI outward stock by about 60% and inward stock by about 30%, everything else equal. It should be noted, however that the FDI restrictiveness index has a broad dispersion and one standard deviation is a relatively large change (the mean is 0.25 and the standard deviation 0.18). 18 The result that outward investment is more strongly related to restrictions on FDI probably indicates that highly protected local telecoms companies are less likely to venture into foreign markets than those operating in more competitive markets.
Also the telecommunication-specific PMR indicator is negatively correlated with both inward and outward FDI stocks in the communication sector, and the relation is of a similar magnitude for inward and outward stock. Again the estimated coefficients are relatively large as a one standard deviation increase in regulatory restrictions is associated with as much as 60% smaller FDI stocks.
This should, however, not be surprising since the regulations that are included in the PMR indicator for telecommunications reflect public ownership and restrictions on the number of firms being allowed to enter the market.
Transport services
No statistically significant relation between sector specific regulation and bilateral FDI stocks were found for the transport sector. This applies both for the PMR indicator and the FDI restrictiveness 17 A simple measure of difference in regulation for these indicators is a dummy that is 1 if a country pair's regulatory index differs by more than one (or alternatively two) standard deviations and zero otherwise. This was tried for both communication and transport services, but the variable was dropped because of collinearity with other variables. It should be noted that the trade and FDI data lump together post and telecommunication, while data on regulation applies to telecommunication only. However, there is evidence that a quite small share of trade and investment can be attributed to postal services, at least for the period covered by these data.
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It is noted, however, that the coefficients lose their statistical significance when country fixed effects are added. This does not necessarily mean that the results are invalid, only that they are less precisely estimated when combined with country fixed effects that are correlated with regulation.
index for the sector, suggesting that such regulations either are not the binding restrictions on FDI, or there is too little variation among the OECD countries for which regulatory data are available for it to have a discernible impact on FDI.
There are nevertheless some interesting findings. First, EU membership is negatively related to bilateral FDI in transport, although there is no evidence that EU membership attracts transport FDI from third countries. As we will see in the next section this could have to do with the impact of EU membership on choice of mode. Second, product market regulation in the potential host country of FDI discourages investment, and this is found for the overall PMR index and the sub-indicators for state control, public ownership and administrative burden on start-ups.
Computer services and other business services
Computer services constitute a relatively small sector with a sample mean bilateral FDI stock of $52 mill. while other business services are a large category with a sample mean of $1100 mill. While computer services are lightly regulated, other business services are much more heavily regulated. For computer services we find that heterogeneity on state control and on state intervention in business operations have a statistically significant and negative relationship to bilateral FDI. In addition, the level of restrictions related to public ownership in the host country is also negatively associated with inward FDI. Thus, interestingly, for computer services it appears that government direct involvement in the economy is the most restricting factor. Possible explanations are that government is a large consumer of computer services, and may have a higher propensity to source from domestic firms, or provide computer services in-house.
Interestingly, heterogeneity in employment regulation (from the World Bank Cost of Doing
Business survey) is negatively related to investment in computer services, an effect that is not observed for any of the other sectors. This may reflect the relatively labour/skills intensive technology used in this sector, and indicates possible complementarity between commercial presence and movement of natural persons. Differences in restrictions on starting a business are also found to be negatively related to bilateral FDI as do differences in the overall doing business indicator and getting credit.
For other business services the same picture emerges. EU membership has a positive impact of FDI, EU members having about 50% higher bilateral FDI stocks than they otherwise would have.
Heterogeneity in the PMR indicators did not have a statistically significant impact on bilateral FDI flows in this sector, but the level of regulation in the area of public ownership is negatively associated with inward investment, but positively associated with outward investment. The latter result is somewhat puzzling, but the likely explanation seems to be that countries with high barriers to trade and investment are less sensitive to distance for their outward investments. As for computer services, government intervention in business operations are negatively associated with inward FDI, and in this What is interesting to notice in this table is that the two sectors that are possibly the most easily traded through all modes of supply, financial services and computer and related services, are the most sensitive to differences in regulation. Whether this is because trade can shift more easily to other modes in these sectors will be further explored below, but Kox and Nordås (2007) found that regulatory heterogeneity also affects cross-border trade negatively, so it is likely that heterogeneity affects both the total volume of trade through all modes and the choice of mode. Finally, it is noticeable that differences in employment regulation features prominently in the computer services industry, and only this sector.
The relation between regulation and choice of mode
Before assessing how regulation may affect the choice of mode of entering a foreign market, i.e. trade as measured in the balance of payment statistics versus commercial presence, it is useful to establish to what extent modes of supply are interrelated. In order to supply a service across borders it may be necessary to establish a commercial presence in the form of a distribution channel, customer service, a joint venture with a local firm etc. For services which can easily be transmitted electronically across borders on the other hand, trade may be either independent of commercial presence or it could be a substitute. If onerous regulation makes it costly to establish a commercial presence, services suppliers may decide to service the market through cross-border trade. Finally, almost half of total services trade is in transport and travel. These two services sectors are likely to be strongly related to trade in goods and to investment both in goods and services. Before multilateral resistance is introduced in the regressions the FDI restrictiveness indicator is statistically significant. It remains negative, but loses its statistical significance when controlling for resistance.
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The relation is statistically significant at a 5% level when using the Poisson maximum likelihood estimator, but not significant when using OLS with fixed effects. These results, when significant, also suggest complementarity between trade in goods and services.
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The number of observations where there is information on trade, FDI stocks and regulation can in some cases be quite small. The regression equation is equation (4) The individual sub-indicators that have a statistically significant impact on the choice of mode are access to credit and enforcement of contracts, which both favour trade. This makes intuitively sense as FDI is likely to depend more on credit and contract enforcement than does trade. It is also noticeable that these two indicators are associated with differences among countries as far as choice of mode is concerned, but does not explain variation in bilateral FDI. Among the standard gravity variables, the most significantly and robustly associated with the choice of mode is common official language, which favours commercial presence over cross-border trade. Countries that share a common language on average have a 50% lower trade to FDI ratio.
In the transport sector, neighbouring countries tend to service each other's market through cross-border trade to a larger extent than countries that do not share a common border. It is recalled that there is a negative border effect in the estimates of determinants of commercial presence in the sector, so this result reinforces the conclusion that neighbouring countries tend to trade transport services while FDI is less important. Countries sharing a common language in contrast, tend to service each other's markets through commercial presence to a larger extent also in this sector. Turning to regulatory measures, more heterogeneous regulation on the overall PMR heterogeneity indicator; explicit barriers to trade and investment; state control; public ownership; and government involvement in business all tilt the trade versus investment towards trade. It is also found that heterogeneity in access to credit and registration of property from the World Bank Cost of Doing Business indicators tilt the trade versus investment ratio towards trade in the former and investment in the latter. The border effect is similar for communication services as it is for transport. Neighbouring countries tend to engage relatively more in cross-border trade, while countries that share a common language tend to service each other's markets relatively more through commercial presence. The only heterogeneity indicator that is significantly associated with the choice of mode in this sector is dealing with licenses from the World Bank indicators. Higher tilts the choice of mode towards trade. Since licensing is very important in this sector, the result makes intuitively sense.
In computer services the heterogeneity indices that were significantly associated with the choice of mode are explicit barriers to trade and investment, which strongly tilts the balance towards trade; government involvement in business; dealing with licenses and overall heterogeneity on the World Bank Cost of Doing Business indicators. The more heterogeneous the indicators, the higher is the relative importance of trade. Heterogeneity in administrative burden on start-ups in contrast, has the opposite effect, which seems somewhat counterintuitive.
For other business services the relative importance of trade in bilateral relations is strongly and positively associated with regulatory heterogeneity. In fact, for this sector it is the only variable included in the regression that is significantly associated with a the choice of mode (together with country dummies) which suggests that countries differ a lot on what determines the choice of mode.
Finally, for financial services sharing a common language is strongly associated with commercial presence as the preferred mode of supply, while neighbouring countries tend to trade more with each other. Interestingly, heterogeneity in the tax regime tilts the trade versus investment regime towards investment. Again our results are similar to Buch and Lipponer (2007) who found that German banks would trade with countries with a weak regulatory system, but they would not invest there. Further, the larger a bank's FDI in a given market, the more it trades with that country, and vice versa, suggesting that trade and commercial presence are complementary. Nevertheless, since trade is more widespread than FDI, FDI is not necessary for trade to take place.
Policy implications
This paper has explored the role of regulation and regulatory heterogeneity for trade through commercial presence and for the choice of mode for services trade. It was found that regulatory heterogeneity is negatively associated with commercial presence and tilts the choice of mode towards trade. The empirical analysis also finds that cross-border trade and commercial presence are complementary to various degrees. That implies that services trade through cross-border supply is restricted if there are barriers to commercial presence, and vice versa. It has not been possible to estimate the impact of restrictions on movement of natural persons, but it is likely that this mode is also to a significant extent complementary to trade and FDI.
The sectors in which the evidence for a relationship between regulatory heterogeneity and trade is strongest are financial services and computer services, where a wide range of regulatory indicators have a statistically significant effect. These are also the sectors that are most easily traded through all modes of supply. Interestingly, the network industries (transport and communications) are the most affected by regulation related to licensing and enforcement of contracts; the choice of mode in the financial sector depends on regulation related to the tax regime; while computer services are affected by regulation in the labour market. From these findings we draw the following policy conclusions:
Commercial presence appears to be increasingly the preferred mode of supply in most services sectors even when cross-border trade is more and more feasible due to improvements in communication technology. Absence of explicit barriers to trade and investment is not necessarily sufficient to attract foreign investors. Thus, regulatory heterogeneity is found to constitute a barrier to entry in its own right. Therefore, regulatory reform may be necessary in order to ensure market access for foreign services providers. Furthermore, international cooperation on regulatory reform, including continuous search for best practice and benchmarking would help reduce unintended regulatory barriers to trade and investment in services. Continuation of work with the view to binding agreements on regulatory principles in the GATS would also help reduce regulatory barriers globally. Note: Column headings refer to the heterogeneity indicator used, which are defined as follows: BT= barriers to trade and investment; EBT= explicit barriers to trade and investment; IBO= government involvement in business; RAO=regulatory and administrative opacity; SAB=regulation related to starting a business (from World Bank); RPR=registering property (from World Bank); ENC=enforcing contracts (from World Bank).
ANNEX 2. DOCUMENTATION OF THE APPLIED POLICY INDICATORS
This annex describes the methodology for the policy indicators used in the present paper. Emphasis is on the documentation of the non-OECD indicators.
To investigate econometrically how and how much the regulatory environment affects the decisions by individual firms we need quantitative indicators. The indicators must cover multiple dimensions of regulatory differences between countries, such as the area of regulation, the types of regulatory instruments, the responsible agencies, the legal status, the sector coverage, exemptions, transparency, and treatment of foreign companies. All dimensions of the regulatory climate may affect the relative costs and attractiveness of direct investment between two countries. A combination of different regulatory indicators may be required to cover all relevant policy differences. For ranking countries in terms of the strictness of their product-market regulation we may need a different indicator than when we want to grasp the overall cost impact of a country's regulatory system on the costs of individual firms. Both indicator approaches are useful, but for different purposes. More detailed indicators are required when we want to pinpoint what types of regulation are most decisive for bilateral trade and FDI. This annex briefly documents the regulation indicators we used in the present study.
Two ways of quantifying differences in economic policies and business environment
The OECD system of indicators for product-market regulation (PMR) forms a seminal contribution to a comprehensive measurement of many aspects of product market regulation across countries (Nicoletti, Boylaud and Scarpetta 2002) . The emphasis in the OECD system of PMR indicators is on providing a consistent set of indicators that measures the relative strictness of product market regulation in a country compared to that in other OECD countries. It also provides summary indicators for sub-areas of product market regulation: barriers to competition; administrative barriers for start-ups; regulatory and administrative opacity; explicit barriers to trade and investment; and state control (Conway et al. 2005 ). The information is based on a large number of different data points, and the information is mainly provided by OECD member governments. Limitations of these indicators are that they do not cover non-OECD countries, and that -at the moment of writing-they were only available for 1998 and 2003.
A different measurement approach is adopted by the Cost of Doing Business project of the World Bank, following prior work by a group of Harvard economists (Djankov et al. 2002; 2008) . They apply a new way for measuring national differences in business climate and institutions. The approach uses fictive but well-defined business cases (e.g. a very specific trading transaction, a firm's request for a specific expansion of a storehouse, or setting up a new firm). The Doing Business team (with local assistance) subsequently quantifies how such standardized business plans are typically handled by a country's regulatory and judicial system and government apparatus (World Bank, 2008) . The same business case is applied in all countries. For each country (in 2008: 181) , they use different and not always revealed private and governmental information sources. 23 They provide an 'Ease of Doing Business' country ranking, for every business area. A ranking list is for our purposes a somewhat inferior way of measuring the relative performance of countries. For this reason we have constructed our own regulation-level indicators on the basis of the World Bank Cost of Doing Business database. This procedure is documented below. The Cost of Doing Business indices are updated each year and they are available for a very large set of countries. The number of measuring points per country is less than for the OECD PMR (sub-)indicators.
A third approach to measuring differences in policy and business environment is developed by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Its emphasis is not on the ranking of countries, but on assessing to what extent specific policies differ between any pair of countries. The background idea is that for the individual company that considers export or FDI, it is important to know to what degree policies in the target country are dissimilar to policies in the firm's home country.
24 For the firm this may even be more important than the question of relative country rankings, since adaptation to and compliance with different policies goes along with changes in working practices and sunk costs. Such adaptation and compliance costs are in fact a latent variable that we cannot observe directly. But we may proxy the importance of such costs by the degree of regulatory heterogeneity (dissimilarity) between country pairs. The basic measurement approach is virtually free of subjective judgements. The method digitalizes policy differences for each pair of countries, thus allowing to aggregate policy items across different dimensions. The reliability of the approach increases with the number of data points used in the measurement. The heterogeneity indices have been calculated on the basis of the full databases that are beneath the OECD's PMR indicators and the World Bank's Cost of Doing Business indicators A recent independent evaluation of the World Bank Cost of Doing Business indicator system (IEG 2008) concluded that "overall the indicators objectively and reliably measure what they set out to measure" and that the indicators indeed depicted regulatory aspects that matter for individual firms. However the evaluators stressed that this is not yet a welfare analysis that also weighs the potential benefits of regulation (e.g. regarding policy areas like 'employing workers' and 'paying taxes'). The evaluation has led to a few changes (World Bank 2008) . 24 See for a more comprehensive description of the bilateral policy heterogeneity indicator, its analytical underpinning and its empirical derivation, Kox and Nordås (2007) and Kox (2009) . The full dataset will become available soon at www.cpb.nl early in 2009. Table A2 .1 summarises the main differences and correspondences between these policy indicators. For an analytical description of the third set of indicators in Table A2 .1 we refer to a former OECD document (Kox and Nordås 2007, Annex 3). Here we describe the method for deriving the regulation indicators 2a and 4 that have been developed for this publication.
Regulation level indicators based on World Bank Cost of Doing Business database
Since the World Bank only produces country rankings on the basis of the Doing Business (DB) database we have decided to produce our own indicators of regulation-caused costs of doing business per country. The Doing Business (DB) database was started in 2003 and in recent years includes 97 data points per year per county on the basis of which the costs of doing business for that country are determined. A large part of the data is collected by measuring the way in which a country handles business plans in specified areas. 25 For two business areas (Getting Credit, Protecting Investors) the selection criteria meant that no variables were left. This leaves us with eight DB regulation areas and 28 subsumed variables that can be used to make comparisons across countries and comparisons over time. All subsumed variables are defined such that an increase of the indicator can be expected to increase the costs of business transactions, and hence also the costs of international trade or FDI transactions with firms in the country. These variables are used to derive regulation level indicators for specified business areas.
We have applied the following aggregation procedure.
1. Divide sub-indicator j score of country i by country-sample average for sub-indicator j, yielding index numbers Q ji (time suffix suppressed);
2. Divide item Q jit score of country i in year t by the corresponding country-sample average in base year 0, yielding normalised indicator R ijt =Q jit /Q j0 ; 3. Correct annual country score R ijt for annual percentage of change in sample average, multiplying by [ 1 -[(Q jt -Q jt-1 )/ Q jt-1 ] ] which yields corrected country scores RC ijt . We have applied simple averages, thus avoiding that subjective elements are added as weights.
4. Aggregate all RC ijt for regulation area A to arrive at transformed and normalised country score RC iAt for regulation area A. It describes the relative costs of doing business in country i that is associated with regulation in business area A. Scoring high on this index can be expected to represent relatively high regulatory costs at firm level. Since the indicator is also normalised with respect to a common base year, RC iAt can also be applied to represent the impacts of deregulation over time. This aspect is useful in the time panel dimension of analysis.
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The selection criteria are: (a) only continuous numerical sub-indicators; (b) only sub-indicators that are directly affected by national regulatory policies; (c) no sub-indicators that rather than describing a country's regulatory characteristics describe strictly political preferences of the country like tax levels or the use of minimum wages (we left out the latter indicators).
The aggregation procedures do not apply any weights, so that the composite heterogeneity indicator per area is not based on subjective information elements. We briefly summarise how the aggregation procedure works, starting with the simplest case:
A. Suppose for instance that business environment area "Registering Property" is measured through three data points P,Q and R for each of which it can unequivocally be assessed whether or not these regulation attributes apply in a country. This gives logical information of a binary nature: we can assess unambiguously whether or not this regulation attribute applies or not. Take item R that we compare for two countries i and j. The dissimilarity indicator . It always has a value between 0 and 1. If HG_RPR=1 it means that the two countries differ in all policy attributes that together measure the area "Registering Property".
B.
This was the simplest case where the basic country information has a binary nature. It becomes a bit more complex when for instance policy item G can have 4 different, discrete values, like 'nonexistent', 'low', 'average' and 'high'. Here we can nonetheless still unequivocally assess whether countries are different or not. But because the number of possible values for G is higher, the likelihood that two countries are different increases. To prevent that the heterogeneity score becomes a function of the number of discrete values that G can have, the number of possible values for a comparison item is compressed, so that it never can have more than six different values. Note that all countries are compared with regard to the same item G, so that the heterogeneity pattern between countries is never disturbed by the fact that some comparison items may take more than two discrete values.
C. Some of the basic variables in the DB database have a continuous numerical value, e.g. the number of days it takes for a firm to get a start-up license. Since continuous variables by their nature can have lots of different values a variety-reducing method has been applied by assigning a limited range of different intervals for a specific continuous variable. Per variable we first determine the maximum range that contains all numerical values in the sample. The range is divided by the standard deviation, yielding a value K. The next step takes care of the higher moments of the distribution by a correction factor E that corrects for the relation between the mean and the standard deviation. 27 Now it is possible to determine the potential number of different value intervals for that numerical variable, using a lower threshold of three categories and a ceiling of maximum six categories:
This procedure is applied individually for each continuous variable. Subsequently, for all countries the continuous variable is re-coded according to the number of intervals Z. The bilateral heterogeneity indicator per item can now be derived as in steps A and B.
27
The correction factor is calculated as: 
D.
The overall bilateral heterogeneity indicator for a specific regulation area X is derived by summing all item-wise heterogeneity indicators for area X and dividing by the number of non-empty data points for that area.
The heterogeneity indicators thus obtained are dimensionless numbers based on digitalising the bilateral differences in economic policy and regulation items. For comparisons over time, it is important that the number and nature of comparison items are constant over time. Otherwise the heterogeneity indicator should be treated as an annual cross section rather than as a time series. We have calculated bilateral heterogeneity indicator HG_ABA2 which is based on those data cells for which information is available over the entire period (covering policy areas HG_SAB, HG_CRE, HG_ENC and HG_CLO). 
